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1 Kaplan's thesis
David Kaplan  (1989) introduced us to the notion of “character.” A character is a function
from contexts to contents where the content in question depends on the type of linguistic
expression in  question.  The content  of  a  sentence is  a  truth-condition.  The content of  a
predicate is a satisfaction condition. The content of a proper name is an object (if this sounds
like  an  odd  way  to  talk,  see  the  footnote).1 For  example,  the  word  “I”  might  have  the
following character: the content of “I” in context C is the speaker of “I” in context C. 2 Given
some circumstance of which to speak, a character fixes the extension of an expression when
supplied with a context. 
Why care about character? According to Kaplan:
…there  is  [a]  sense  of  meaning  in  which,  absent  lexical  or  syntactical  
ambiguities,  two occurrences  of  the  same word or  phrase  must mean the same.  
(Otherwise  how could we learn and communicate  with language?) This  sense of  
meaning—which I call character—is what determines the content of an occurrence of 
a word or phrase in a given context. (Kaplan 1989:524) 
Kaplan's “how could?” betrays the belief that the meanings of linguistic expressions must be
characters if communication with language is possible. 
1 We  can  distinguish  between  propositional  and  non-propositional  theories  of  “meaning”  (cf.
(Speaks 2014)). I use the scare-quotes around “meaning” because in what follows, it will be an
open question whether these theories are theories of meaning in the sense of “meaning” with which
we will be concerned. A propositional theory of “meaning” assigns objects to context-insensitive
expressions.  These objects are  diverse.  For example,  for  sentences they will  be  functions from
circumstances  of  evaluation to truth-values  (AKA propositions)  but  for  predicates  they will  be
functions  from  circumstances  of  evaluation  to  sets  of  objects  (AKA  properties).  A  non-
propositional  theory doesn't  assign  objects  to  linguistic  expressions.  Again,  for  example,  for  a
sentence,  it  describes  a  condition  under  which  that  sentence  is  true,  and,  for  a  predicate,  it
describes a condition under which an object satisfies that predicate. In the current paper, when I
talk of content I am talking about the objects assigned to expressions in a propositional theory of
“meaning.” However, these are ways of specifying what is specified by a non-propositional theory.
For example, a proposition (a function from circumstances of evaluation to truth-values) describes
a condition under which a sentence would be true, if that sentence expressed that proposition: viz.
whatever is so in each circumstance of evaluation in which the proposition maps to the truth-value
true. For this reason, I talk about the content of a sentence as a truth-condition; mutatis mutandis
other kinds of linguistic expression. Finally, I stress that the words “proposition” and “property”
are sometimes used to speak of what will, in this paper, be called “meaning.” When used in this
sense, they are not being used as they are used in describing a theory of “meaning” (e.g. to speak of
a  function  from  circumstances  of  evaluation  to  truth-values  and  to  speak  of  a  function  from
circumstances of evaluation to objects, respectively). On this ambiguity, see (Travis 1978:421). The
assumption that these two senses of “proposition” and “property” are co-extensive is substantive
and may be false. I discuss this further in section 2.
2 The language used to describe the content and character of an expression may itself be context-
sensitive. If it is then it is possible that the context in which such descriptions are made doesn't fix
what counts as being the content or character in question. See  (Gross 2005) and  (Travis 1978;
1981) for discussion of this concern. In the current paper I will assume that this problem doesn't
arise.
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Let's  say  that  linguistic  expressions  are  words  of  a  language  and  complex  expressions
(including sentences) formed from them. Although I will expand on this in the next section,
let's say that the meaning of “meaning” leaves open whether or not meaning is a character
but it is nonetheless something that is invariant across different uses of an expression that
has  it.  Linguistic  communication  involves  the  production  of  linguistic  expressions  by  a
speaker to a hearer, where both speaker and hearer speak the same language. At the very
least, the possibility of successful linguistic communication requires that a hearer be in a
position  to  know  what  proposition  a  speaker  intends  by  her  sentence  when  the  hearer
observes that speaker utter the sentence (in context). With these prefatory remarks, we can
say that in the quoted passage, Kaplan is in effect putting forward the following thesis:
Kaplan's Thesis
It is possible for a hearer to be in a position to know what proposition a speaker  
intends by her sentence when the hearer observes that speaker utter the sentence (in 
context) only if the meaning of a linguistic expression is a character.
My interest in Kaplan's thesis lies in the fact that it can be used to construct an argument
against a thesis championed by Charles Travis; namely, occasion-sensitivity. According to
one straightforward statement of occasion-sensitivity:
…in the general case, expressions don’t have definite characters. A fortiori, they don’t
have contents even on occasion, though what is said via them might. The meaning of 
an expression is nothing like a content. (Travis 1978:429 fn.9)3
When Travis denies that expressions have characters, he's denying that their meanings are
characters.4 So occasion-sensitivity is the rejection of a reductive hypothesis:
Character Hypothesis
The meaning of a linguistic expression is a character.
The aforementioned argument against occasion-sensitivity is an argument in favour of the
character hypothesis. It is as follows:
Argument against occasion-sensitivity
1) It  is  possible  for  a  hearer  to  be in  a  position to  know what  proposition a
speaker intends by her sentence when the hearer observes that speaker utter
the sentence (in context) only if the meaning of a linguistic expression is a
character. (Kaplan's thesis)
3 Other statements can be found in:  (Travis 1985:188),  (Travis 1996:94), (Travis 1997:112),  (Travis
2000:xi), (Travis 2006a:13ff), and (Travis 2008:2–3). Many of these statements don't include the
explicit denial that linguistic expressions have characters—they focus on contents. A very careful
and more general statement of the view, one which makes it clear that Travis intends the view to
apply not just to linguistic expressions but to any item which can bear meanings and contents, can
be found in the first chapter of (Travis 1989).
4 One might think that, trivially, linguistic expressions have characters because there'll always be
some way of mapping contexts of use to contents for all actual contents an expression ever ends up
having. However, the proposal that the meaning of an expression is a character is a proposal about
something  which  guides  proper  use.  It  is  not  a  proposal  about  the  possibility  of  producing  a
summary of the history of an expression's use. For discussion see (Travis 1978) and (Travis 1981).
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2) It  is  possible  for  a  hearer  to  be in  a  position to  know what  proposition a
speaker intends by her sentence when the hearer observes that speaker utter
the sentence (in context). (assumption)
Therefore:
3) The meaning of a linguistic expression is a character (from (1), (2) and modus
ponens).
It's  hard  to  imagine  someone  who  would  deny  the  second  premise—they  undermine
themselves  in  telling  you  its  wrong.  Moreover,  it  seems  that  many  will  grant  the  first
premise. Kaplan is far from the only one to commit to Kaplan's thesis. Stenius  (1967:258)
claims that if  the meanings of linguistic expressions weren't (items that play the role of)
characters then linguistic communication would be impossible. Lewis (1969:49–51) assumes
that the meaning of an expression is something that functions as a character  and that this
meaning  constitutes  the  only  solution  to  a  coordination  problem  between  would-be
communicators.5 Never mind precisely what a coordination problem is. What matters for
present  purposes  is  that  if  there  is  a  coordination  problem  then  there  is  a  problem  of
ensuring that the content a speaker intends by her expressions when she utters them is what
a hearer would take their content to be. So insofar as there is a coordination problem, there
is no successful linguistic communication. In response to Davidson's (1986) declaration that
there is no such thing as a language (roughly, and in the terms of this paper, a shared system
of  linguistic  expressions  with  meanings  that  fix  the  expressions'  contents  in  context),
Dummett  (1986: e.g. 474; 1994), Hornsby (2009: 114) and Reimer (2004: 324) object that
the meanings of linguistic expressions (what you learn when you learn the language) must do
what Davidson says they don't because if they didn't linguistic communication would not be
possible.  In  response to  Travis'  proposal  that  occasion-sensitivity  might  be  true,  Stanley
(2007:8–9) charges that if Travis were right, then action based on communication could not
be  coordinated  in  the  way  it  evidently  is  (implicitly  because  successful  linguistic
communication would not be possible).6
But then many will accept premises which entail that occasion-sensitivity is false. A problem
for anyone wishing to get occasion-sensitivity more widespread acceptance is the acceptance
of these premises. To my knowledge, Travis doesn't discuss the Argument against Occasion-
sensitivity.7 This is reasonable, given just how little argument typically goes into supporting
Kaplan's thesis. My aim in the present paper is to argue against Kaplan's thesis. I aim to
5 Why think  he  thinks  this  is  the  only  solution?  Firstly,  Lewis  only  discusses  the  solution  of  a
communicative coordination problem by the adoption of  a  convention,  which suggests that  he
thinks that this is the only way to solve it. Secondly, there's the following remark: “...so long as even
two languages are humanly possible, it must be by convention that a population chooses to use one
or the other.” (ibid, p.50)
6 Recanati (2004; 2010) and Sperber and Wilson (1986) are often classified under the same banner
as Travis  vis a vis their  views on meaning.  This is  a mistake for reasons which Travis  (1990)
explains in  relation  to  Sperber  and  Wilson  (though  the  point  carries  over  to  Recanati):  both
Sperber and Wilson, and Recanati, posit items whose meanings are contents (albeit at a mental
level) but Travis denies that there are any such items—linguistic or otherwise. There may also be a
further reason to think this classification is a mistake. These philosophers believe that it is possible
to construct a single psychological theory which allows one to predict what contents sentences will
have whenever uttered. Travis (e.g. (2013)) clearly thinks that such a theory is not possible. There
isn't  the  commonality  in  the  world  for  a  single  theory  to  be  applicable.  However,  given  the
definition of occasion-sensitivity with which I'll be working in this paper, the view doesn't entail
that such a theory is impossible. So such a view is not a target of the current paper. The target of
the current paper is the identification of meaning with character.
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show that it doesn't follow simply from the denial of the character hypothesis that linguistic
communication is not possible.
I'll begin in section 2 by providing a more precise specification of occasion-sensitivity. In
section 3, I'll show that the character hypothesis implies that the content of an expression in
context is a conventional feature of that expression. In section 4, I will describe a kind of
property which objects can have if they are employed in a certain kind of activity—what I will
call  a  “practico-normative  property.”  Practico-normative  properties  are  not  conventional
properties.  In  section  5,  I  put  forward  the  hypothesis  that  expressions  in  context  have
contents which are practico-normative properties (I call these practico-normative contents).
In section 6, I describe a way in which successful linguistic communication could take place
(“the Evans method”) which makes use of the practico-normative contents of expressions in
context. This way of communicating doesn't require any conventional feature of linguistic
expressions to fix the content of those expressions in context and therefore doesn't require
the character hypothesis to be true. Hence, this possibility shows that Kaplan's thesis is false
and that the Argument against Occasion-sensitivity is unsound. In section 7, I argue that the
Evans method also provides us with a built-in explanation of  why adherents  of Kaplan's
thesis are adherents of that thesis even though it  is  false.  In brief,  when considering the
possibility of successful linguistic communication, they focus on a peculiar kind of context
which, although not very common, is one in which the Evans method doesn't work. So if one
thought  it  were  common then one would think that  successful  linguistic  communication
cannot  be  effected  by  the  Evans  method.  I  close  in  section  8  with  a  summary  of  the
discussion.
2 Occasion-sensitivity: some details
I have already introduced occasion-sensitivity as the thesis that meanings aren't characters. I
want to expand on this so as to avoid otherwise likely misunderstandings. The simplest way
to  an  adequate  definition  requires  us  to  draw  two  distinctions.  The  first  distinction  is
between  the  meaning  of  an  expression  and  the  content  of  that  expression.  Unless  we
stipulate otherwise,  it  is  an open question whether the meaning of an expression can be
identified with, or understood in terms of, content. So for example, although the word “girl”
means girl, what is required to count as being a girl, and hence, in the extension of “girl,” is a
second and distinct  question. The meaning of “girl”  may fix this but equally it  may not.
Similarly, the meaning of the word “girl” may fix a function from features of the context in
7 Travis  (2006b) does  address  an  argument  put  forward  in  chapter  8  of  (Cappelen and Lepore
2005),  which  may  look  like  the  Argument  against  Occasion-sensitivity.  That  argument  is  as
follows. Features f1...fn of a context fix the content of an utterance of “Philosophy is fun.” To know
what content was expressed by the utterance of “Philosophy is fun” one would have to know these
features. It would be a miracle if one knew these features. There are no miracles, so one doesn't
know these features.  So one cannot  know the content  of  the utterance of  “Philosophy is  fun.”
Notice first that the view attacked isn't necessarily occasion-sensitivity: such a view is consistent
with meanings being characters (which is why I'm not including Cappelen and Lepore among the
adherents of Kaplan's thesis). But second, notice that the list of features provided by Cappelen and
Lepore is a list of features which (according to some) could determine the content of “Philosophy is
fun” in some context or other. It doesn't follow from their so being that they determine the content
of “Philosophy is fun” in  each context in which it may be uttered. But then the second premise
doesn't follow from the first: in order to know the content of an utterance of “Philosophy is fun”
you don't need to know all or even most of these features. You just have to know the features that
determine the content in that particular context. But then the third premise looks decidedly under-
supported. To know just some of the listed features isn't miraculous. Travis'  response concedes
more to Cappelen and Lepore than I do here. But in any case, since the argument isn't about the
relation of meaning and character, it isn't the Argument against Occasion-sensitivity.
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which “girl” is used to contents. But equally, it may not fix such a function. That is also an
open question.
The second distinction is between two ways of using the locution “content.” I can provide
some composition rules  which show you how the truth-value of  the  sentence “a  is  F” is
related to the extensions of the constituent expressions “a” and “is F.” From these rules one
can derive a biconditional of the form: “a is F” is true if and only if a is F. One can call this
biconditional a description of the truth-condition of the sentence “a is F.” One can do all this
without having given any indication of what condition the world has to be in in order for the
sentence “a is F” to be true (because one hasn't given any indication of what it is to be a or to
be F). That is one notion of truth-condition. Another notion of truth-condition requires any
statement of a sentence’s truth-condition to answer questions which the first notion leaves
unaddressed,  viz.  what  conditions  of  the  world  would  make  the  sentence  true,  false,  or
neither? Call the first notion of truth-condition a  compositional truth-condition because it
concerns the relation between properties of sentential expressions and properties of their
parts, whatever they may be. Call the second notion of a truth-condition a  worldly truth-
condition because it concerns a property of a sentence which involves the extra-linguistic
world in  a way that  compositional  truth-conditions do not.  A parallel  distinction can be
drawn  for  the  contents  of  other  expressions.  So  more  generally  we  can  speak  of  the
compositional content of an expression and the worldly content of that expression.
We can now define occasion-sensitivity as the following thesis:
Occasion-Sensitivity
The meaning of a linguistic expression is not a function from features of a context to
worldly contents of that expression.
When I speak of “character” I mean to speak of such a function. The function in question
may be a constant function so that the content of an expression is the same in all contexts.8
Given  this  definition  we  can  acknowledge  two  facts  about  occasion-sensitivity.  Firstly,
occasion-sensitivity  is  not  the  Davidsonian  (1986) idea  that  the  meanings  of  linguistic
expressions are in constant flux. It is a claim about what meaning, when invariant, does. So
8 MacFarlane  (2009:  246) makes  the  following  proposal:  the  content  of  an  expression  is  not  a
function from worlds (and possibly times) to extensions, but rather, a function from worlds and
values of a counts-as parameter (and possibly times) to extensions. Changes in the value of the
counts-as parameter are not to be understood as changes in the condition which that of which we
speak must meet in order for what we say about that of which we speak to be true.  Changes in
values of the counts-as parameter are changes in what aspect of that of which we speak (i.e. the
world, broadly speaking) we are speaking about. So, for instance, just as we can make claims about
what is so in a given place at different times, so too (according to MacFarlane), we can make claims
which are about what is so in a given place, at a given time, when this parameter has different
values. Is this proposal incompatible with occasion-sensitivity? Insofar as it is a proposal about the
meanings of words, yes. If occasion-sensitivity is true then even once one fixes all aspects of that of
which  one  speaks  (including  whatever  corresponds  to  the  values  of  MacFarlane's  counts-as
parameter), the meaning of an expression that one uses to make a claim about that of which one
speaks  should  leave  open  what  counts  as  falling  within  the  extension  of  that  expression.  But
according to MacFarlane, it doesn't. Can we test whether MacFarlane is right? No. For, in order to
check whether intuitive extensions behave as he predicts, we need to know when each aspect of
that of which one speaks changes. We need to know that so that we can check whether, even once
they are held constant, the intuitive extension of an expression with a given meaning can change
with changes of context in which that expression is used.  We do know, it  seems, when worlds
change and when times change. But we don't know when whatever corresponds to the counts-as
parameter changes.  So until  more is  said about  what  corresponds to the counts-as  parameter,
MacFarlane's hypothesis, although (if understood as a claim about meaning) incompatible with
occasion-sensitivity, is (in this respect) untestable.
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the  thesis  that  words  have  context-invariant  meanings  is  simply  not  under  threat  from
occasion-sensitivity. No one is denying that there is a significant difference between someone
who has learnt the meanings of  various Estonian words and someone who has not.  The
question to which occasion-sensitivity is an answer is whether learning no more than their
meanings (and syntax) sums up to a knowledge of the contents of expressions in context.
Secondly, occasion-sensitivity does not preclude invariant relations between meanings and
compositional contents. Formal semantics however is,  by and large, concerned only with
compositional  contents.  No  formal  semanticist  constructs  descriptions  of  what  precisely
counts  as  being  red,  a  woman,  weighing  80  kilos  etc.  So  in  denying  that  linguistic
expressions  have  characters  that  deal  in  worldly  contents,  occasion-sensitivity  is  not  in
conflict with the discipline of formal semantics.9
We're  interested  in  whether  Kaplan's  thesis  is  true.  With  the  foregoing  clarification  of
occasion-sensitivity,  we can now be more precise.  The meanings of linguistic expressions
leave open exactly what (worldly) contents those words have in context (or so I am supposing
for the purposes of this paper). For instance, the meaning of “black” leaves open whether the
following  objects  fall  within  the  extension  of  the  word's  extension:  a  kettle  made  from
normal  aluminium but soot  covered; a kettle  made from normal  aluminium but painted
black;  a  cast  iron  kettle  that  is  glowing  in  the  heat;  a  kettle  made  from  cast  iron  but
enamelled white on the inside (or alternatively, outside); a kettle made from cast iron with a
lot of brown grease stains on the outside (cf.  (Travis 1985:197)). The meaning leaves this
open. Consequently, it leaves open what the worldly content of “black” is. The question we're
interested in is this. Although the meanings of linguistic expressions leave this much open, is
it  possible for a hearer to be in a position to know what (worldly) proposition a speaker
intends  by  her  sentence  when  the  hearer  observes  that  speaker  utter  the  sentence  (in
context) only if  the meanings of linguistic expressions are characters (i.e.  functions from
features of the context of use of these expressions to worldly contents)? Henceforth when I
speak of contents, I mean worldly contents.
3 Conventional contents
The  character  hypothesis  implies  something  about  the  way  in  which  the  context  of  an
expression depends upon the context of use of the expression. If the character hypothesis is
true  then  the  way  in  which  content  depends  upon the  context  of  use  is  a  conventional
property of that content. 
Something is a conventional property of an object if that object has that property because it
is treated as having it by a particular class of agents. For an object to be treated as having a
given  property  is  for  a  given  group  of  agents  to  behave  as  though  that  object  has  that
property. For example, the lamp post outside 22 Haddon Road had the property of being a
goal post during the kids' football game last Tuesday evening because they so treated it. It
gained that property because of its treatment. Other properties are not conventional. The
lamp post would be made of steel no matter how much the kids tried to treat it as made of
jelly. 
9 See  (Predelli 2005) for a splendid explanation of this. There is an important glitch in Predelli's
paper.  He  writes  as  though,  in  showing  that  occasion-sensitivity  and  formal  semantics  are
consistent,  he  is  undermining  Travis'  (1985) claim  that  the  truth  of  occasion-sensitivity  has
exciting consequences for semantics. By “semantics,” Travis doesn't seem to have meant formal
semantics  (even if  formal  semantics  is  sometimes called “truth-conditional  semantics”).  Travis
seems to have meant the project of reducing meaning to content and/or character proposed by the
likes  of  Lewis  (1973) and the  early  Davidson  (1967).  Nonetheless,  Predelli  aptly  explains  why
occasion-sensitivity is not incompatible with formal semantics.
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The  character  hypothesis  identifies  the  meaning  of  an  expression  with  a  character.  The
meaning  of  an  expression  is  a  conventional  property.10 When  I  learn  the  meanings  of
Estonian  words,  I  consult  Estonians.  Their  judgements  about  what  words  mean  are
definitive. If they change, then so do the right answers to questions about the meanings of
words in Estonian. So if the meaning of an expression is a character then the latter must be a
conventional property of the expression as well. “naine” in Estonian means woman insofar as
speakers of Estonian so treat “naine.” If the character hypothesis is true then Conchita Wurst
doesn't fall within the extension of “naine” in a given context insofar as speakers of Estonian
so treat “naine” in that context.
The fact that the character hypothesis implies that the content of an expression in context is
a conventional feature of that expression will prove important for showing that there is a
method  for  communicating  which  doesn't  require  the  character  hypothesis  to  be  true;
something I  will  attempt  in  section 6.  For  I  will  show this  by  showing that  the  method
doesn't rely on the conventional properties of a linguistic expression and hence, given this
implication, any purported meaning-cum-character of that expression.
4 Practico-Normative Properties
In order to describe the way of communicating linguistically which I will describe in section
6,  I  need to draw attention to a kind of  property that  an object  can acquire  from being
employed within an action. As we'll see in section 5, linguistic expressions can have contents
in context which are properties of this kind. Describing this kind of property is the task of the
current section.
There are things one does which one does in order to do or be doing something else. For
instance, one is at the swimming pool. One kicks one’s legs and moves one’s arms in order to
propel oneself  forward or so that  one is  moving forward.  Or similarly,  one types on the
keyboard in order to produce a chapter or so that one is typing a chapter. I am going to use
the  terminology  of  “means”  and  “ends”  to  describe  this.  A  means  does  not  have  to  be
temporally prior to the achievement of the end. They can be coincident. We already have two
examples of this: kicking legs to be swimming; typing on a keyboard to be writing a chapter.
Let us say that if one does A in order to do or be doing B then B is one’s end and A is one’s
means. One’s ends give one reasons to do things which are means to those ends and reasons
to  avoid  doing  things  which  thwart  one’s  ends.  Someone  who  is  rational  will  act  in
accordance with what they have reason to do and to avoid doing. For example, if an end of
mine is to stay alive, then I have a reason to walk across a busy main road only when the
traffic is clear. If I want some food then I have reason to do something that will result in me
being in the state of having some food, e.g. going to the fridge.
10 At least, that seems to be a fairly plausible assumption with a long history; cf.  (Austin 1950:118–
119),  (Frege 1892),  (Locke 1689 chapter 2),  and  (de Saussure 1916:67).  Notably,  in addition to
committing  themselves  to  Kaplan's  thesis,  the  adherents  of  Kaplan's  thesis  each  commit
themselves to this further thesis. Kaplan (1989:523) takes meaning to be constituted by linguistic
conventions.  Stenius  (1967:262) does  the same.  Lewis  (1969:1) takes  the thesis  as  his  starting
point. Dummett (1986:474) uses “meaning” interchangeably with “conventional significance” and
that  which  is  known when one  has  “knowledge  of  a  language.”  Hornsby  (2009:108–109) and
Reimer (2004:320–321) lay out the position they seek to defend (the one which Davidson (1986)
attacks)  according  to  which  the meanings  of  expressions  are  conventional  properties  of  those
expressions. Although  Stanley doesn't use the word “conventional,” he  (2007:5–7) does commit
himself to the thesis that the meanings of words are what speakers of the relevant language behave
as though they are—that's a presupposition of the method he describes for the linguist studying the
truth-conditions of sentences.
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There are two features of actions related as means to ends which I want to register. The first
is this:
End Dependence
With changes in one’s ends, there are changes in the status of activities as means to
one’s ends. 
Only certain activities will result in certain ends. If I want to get to King’s Cross then the
taking of only certain buses will be a means to that end. If I want to go to Camberwell then
those same buses will not be a means to that end. If I want to stay where I am, no (operating)
bus will be  a means to my end. The second feature is this:
Circumstance Dependence
With changes of circumstance, there are changes in the status of activities as means
to one’s ends. 
For example, whether, in walking,  I am walking north depends upon whether I have my
bearings right. If I took a wrong turn then unbeknownst to me I would be walking south
rather  than north.  In  walking  or  by  walking  I  am not  then  walking  north.  Whether  my
walking is my doing that depends upon the circumstances. There is a sense in which, even
when in some sense I am not walking north, I can still be said truly to be walking north.
Suppose for instance that I have to take a minor road which goes back on itself slightly. I
could  still  report  that  I  was  going  north  if  someone  was  trying  to  check  my  general
movements, and so where I will be in the next 20 minutes. Precisely when one can no longer
be said to be walking north will depend partly, it seems, on what is meant by “walking north”
in the context in which one is said to do so, and partly on just how badly one deviates from
doing what one needs to be doing in order to be (doing what counts as) walking north. So
there  are  complexities  here.  But  I  want  to  bracket  these  for  the  purposes  of  this  paper
(though for discussion see (Anscombe 1957) (especially sections 31 and 32) on different ways
of falsifying an intention, and (Falvey 2000)). Despite these complexities, it is nonetheless
true  that  whether  a  given  activity  is  a  means  to  a  given  end  depends,  in  part,  on  the
circumstances in which the activity is done.
Someone who is pursuing a given end has reason to pursue means to that end and she has
reason  to  avoid  doing  things  which  are  not  reasons  to  that  end.  Thus,  given  end  and
circumstance dependence, what a rational agent has reason to do will change with changes in
end and circumstance. Here are two examples.
First, suppose that by moving the window one is moving a patch of light across the wall. If
one moves the window without any intention of moving the patch of light, then whether the
patch of light is moving across the wall, and what would be required to make that happen,
and keep that happening, furnish one with no reason to change how it is that one is moving
the window. But if one is moving the window with this intention then one's circumstances
furnish one with reasons to move the window in different ways depending upon what would
be required, in the circumstances, for one to be moving the light across the wall by moving
the window. So for instance, there may be some ways of moving the window which aren't
instances of moving the patch of light across the wall. Perhaps, it is only when the window is
at certain angles that any light is cast on the wall at all from the window. So one ought to
move it only within a certain range of angles.
Here's  a  second  example.  Suppose  one  is  sitting  in  a  boat,  in  the  sea,  with  the  engine
running. If one is moving the rudder in order to sail to the Isle of White then one ought to
move the rudder in a way which is coordinated with various features of one's circumstances.
One's circumstances give one reasons to change how one is handling the rudder, if one has
this end in these circumstances. For example, with changes in the currents and the wind,
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there will be changes to whether turning or holding the rudder in a given location will be for
one to be sailing to the Isle of White. For the agent to continue to be sailing to the Isle of
White  by moving the rudder,  she must change how she does so in accordance with the
dictates of her circumstances. Of course, things will be different if one has a different end
which one is pursuing by moving the rudder.
Now, suppose that  the  means for  a  given end involves  the manipulation of  an object:  a
rudder, a window, etc. The reasons the agent has for doing things will be reasons for using
the rudder or window in a certain way. If Sam is sailing to the Isle of White and the sea
conditions  are  such  and such,  then she  has  reason  to  move the  rudder  in  a  given  way.
Provided that there are no overriding reasons to do otherwise, it follows that Sam ought to
move  the  rudder  in  the  relevant  way.  Furthermore,  given  an  implicit  relativisation  to
particular agents, passivised equivalents follow. If Sam ought to move the rudder in that way,
then the rudder ought to be moved in that way by Sam. The subject of the sentence here
needn't be restricted to just Sam. The subject can be extended to anyone engaged in the same
action in the same circumstances. So we can generalise across a range of agents for which the
passivised claim would be true. In this way we arrive at claims such as: the rudder ought to
be moved in that way (by anyone engaged in Sam's project in Sam's circumstances).
These passivised statements describe properties of objects which those objects have when
their use is enveloped in the pursuit of wider actions in given circumstances. I will call such
properties practico-normative properties. They are practical because they are had by objects
only insofar as the objects are used in pursuit of a given action. They are normative because
they concern the proper use of the object.
A circumstance can vary in the degree to which it provides constraints on means to a given
end.  For example,  if  there are two routes that  Sam could take to the Isle of  White,  and
nothing gives her any more reason to take one over the other, then there won't be a unique
way in which Sam ought to use the rudder of his boat. There may be two disjoint ways of
using  it  between  which  neither  her  end  nor  her  circumstances  provide  reason  to  pick
between. The circumstances could provide more constraints on means than this or less. The
fewer  the constraints,  the  laxer  the practico-normative  properties  of  the  relevant  object,
potentially to the point where it doesn't have any such properties. Let's say that when the
circumstances provide enough constraints to make only one determinate way of using the
object a means to the end pursued in those circumstances, the circumstances are dense.
I  want  to  draw  attention  to  two  features  of  practico-normative  properties:  one  is
metaphysical and the other is epistemological.  Firstly, the metaphysical feature. Practico-
normative properties aren't conventional properties. You cannot make moving the rudder a
given way a means to getting to the Isle of White by getting everybody to treat it as such.
Whether that way of moving the rudder is a means to that end is what it is, no matter what it
is treated as being. This metaphysical feature implies the epistemic feature. To identify the
practico-normative  properties  of  an  object,  it  would  suffice  to  examine  the  (dense)
circumstances of the object in question. One doesn't need to know what practico-normative
properties any particular group of people treat the object as having. If one can identify the
ends  in  pursuit  of  which  the  object  is  being  used,  and  if  one  knows  enough  of  the
circumstances in which those ends are being pursued, and if one can work out what is a
means to those ends in those circumstances, then one can know how the object ought to be
used (therein). If I watch Sam in his boat, and I know his end is to sail to the Isle of White,
and I know enough about the currents and the winds, I can know what Sam ought to do with
the rudder—I can know what ought to be done with the rudder. Because what Sam or others
might treat as a means to an end doesn't change what really is a means to an end, who treats
what as a means to an end isn't something one needs to know in order to know the practico-
normative properties of the rudder.
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5 Non-conventional contents
Linguistic expressions are objects which get used in a certain kind of action—speaking. That
action is something which functions as a means to various ends. So if what has been said in
the previous section is accurate then it should apply to the use of linguistic expressions in
speaking. A user of linguistic expressions will have certain ends and will be pursuing those
ends  in  certain  circumstances.  Because the linguistic  expressions  will  have the  status  of
means to the pursued ends, in those circumstances, only if employed with certain contents
and not with others, the language user has a reason to use the linguistic expressions in those
ways and not in others. That means, given the transformation to the passive, that there are
contents with which the linguistic expressions ought to be used when those ends are pursued
in those circumstances. So as an instance of a general case, we have:
PN Hypothesis
The ends being pursued in the context of use, and the circumstances in which they 
are being pursued, make an utterance of an expression in that context a means to  
those ends only if it is used with a given content.11
Let's call the content in question the practico-normative content of the expression. It is a
content  with  which an expression ought  to  be  used.  There  are  two features  of  practico-
normative  contents  of  expressions  to  which  I  want  to  draw  attention.  Each  feature
corresponds to a feature of practico-normative properties that was described at the end of
the previous section. Firstly, practico-normative contents are not conventional properties of
expressions in context. The character hypothesis would make whether Conchita Wurst falls
within the extension of “naine” in a given context something which is determined by how, for
instance, Estonian speakers would treat Wurst as being (just like the meaning of the word
“naine” in Estonian). But the practico-normative content of an expression in context would
not fix the corresponding extension of the expression in any such way. It would be a matter
of what is a means to the ends pursued in the context—something about which, in principle,
all  Estonian  speakers  could  be  mistaken  or  agnostic.  Secondly,  the  second  feature  of  a
practico-normative content is that if one is aware of the context of an expression, and one
possesses an understanding of what is a means to what end, in the circumstances, then it is
possible for one to know the practico-normative content of the expression—for these are the
determining factors of that content and how they do so is not fixed by how a class of people
(e.g. Estonian speakers) treat them as doing so.
6 Why Kaplan's thesis is false
As a reminder, here again is Kaplan's thesis:
Kaplan's thesis
It is possible for a hearer to be in a position to know what proposition a speaker  
intends by her sentence when the hearer observes that speaker utter the sentence (in 
context) only if the meaning of a linguistic expression is a character.
I now want to argue that Kaplan's thesis is false—there is a way in which a hearer could be in
a position to know what proposition a speaker intends by her sentence when the hearer
11 Travis  seems to  endorse the view that  the content  of  an expression in  context  is  its  practico-
normative content. This is most explicit in (Travis 2013) and in less detail in other places such as
(Travis 1996) and in the first chapter of (Travis 2006a). However, that view is never presented as a
response to Kaplan's thesis—something I will do in section 6.
10
observes that speaker utter  the sentence (in context) without the meaning of a linguistic
expression being a character.
Here is a way in which successful linguistic communication could take place. Suppose that
expressions of a language have meanings but those meanings don't fix the contents of those
expressions (as explained in section 2).  Suppose also that  the PN hypothesis is  true and
finally  suppose  that  for  each  expression  the  speaker  utters,  she  intends  to  express  the
practico-normative content  of  that  expression in  context.  Then the hearer  can know the
speaker's intended content for each expression if she knows the practico-normative content
of each expression in the context.12 She can know this by identifying the ends being pursued
in  the  context  and  by  examining  the  circumstances  for  the  constraints  they  supply  on
possible means to those ends (as explained in section 5). The contents will compose to form
propositions—given a  compositional  semantics.  But then the speaker and the hearer can
alight upon the same contents for the same expressions in context even though the meanings
of those expressions leave open the contents of those expressions.
The situation is very much like one described by Gareth Evans. A student reads out an essay
which we are to  suppose requires  stating how a car  engine works.  The student says the
sentence, “A spark is produced electrically inside the carburettor,” and a classmate says, “He
means the cylinder.” Of this Evans says: 
...to be saying that a spark is produced in the cylinder is what, given his general plans 
and his  situation,  the subject should be doing; that  is,  doing that  is  what would  
conform best with the subject‘s plans at this moment. The truth which he should  
have been trying to express at this point is that a spark is produced in the cylinder. 
(Evans 1982:130–131)
The classmate knew what the student ought to have been saying because she knew what the
student was trying to do in uttering his sentence and how this constrained what he ought to
do  with his  words.  Admittedly,  Evans  doesn't  distinguish between meaning  and content
whereas we are. So we should restrict talk about what the student ought to have been saying
to talk about the contents he should have intended by given expressions in context i.e. to
what he should count as being black rather than to which word he should utter (“black” or
some other?) or to with which meaning he should use a word. Nonetheless, the common idea
is this. If the circumstances of someone‘s speaking and her ends in speaking are rich enough,
then there are ways the speaker ought to be using her words (more specifically: with which
contents), and anyone (suitably equipped) could see that that was so who was able to witness
the speaking episode and its circumstances. So if the speaker intends what she ought then
one  can  discern  what  she  intends  by  discerning  what  she  ought  to  intend.  I  will  call
communication achieved by means of the speaker and hearer searching for the practico-
normative contents of expressions in context the Evans method of communication (though I
do not mean to imply that Evans himself thought we communicate via the Evans method).
The Evans method doesn't require that the conventional properties of linguistic expressions
distinguish a particular content from all  the contents an expression could have given its
meaning. If the PN hypothesis is true then, without them doing that, the  speaker and the
hearer can nonetheless distinguish one content from all those which an expression with a
given meaning could have by searching for the practico-normative content of the expression
in its context of use. That task requires knowledge of only the ends pursued in the context
and the circumstances which bear upon the means to those ends:  those together fix  the
practico-normative contents of the expressions in that context. The way in which ends and
circumstances determine what would be means to those ends is not conventional: again, you
cannot make a certain way of moving the rudder of the boat a way of sailing to the Isle of
12 I'm taking for granted that if you're a language speaker then you are rational and this is something
others can know about you.
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White just by getting everyone to agree to treat it as though it is. For this reason, the task
facing interlocutors who deploy the Evans method does not require knowledge of what any
class of agents (e.g. Estonian speakers) would count as the (practico-normative) content of
those expressions in context. They are what they are regardless. Hence the Evans method
can be deployed without appealing to the conventional properties of linguistic expressions.
Meanings-cum-characters  are  conventional  properties  of  linguistic  expressions.  So
meanings-cum-characters  don't  play  any  role  in  the  Evans  method.  But  then  the  Evans
method  can  be  successfully  deployed  even  if  the  character  hypothesis  is  false.  We  can
conclude  then  that  the  Evans  method  is  a  way  of  engaging  in  successful  linguistic
communication which doesn't  require the character hypothesis  to be true.  It  is  a way of
utilizing the non-conventional properties of linguistic expressions in context for the purpose
of successful linguistic communication. If so then Kaplan's thesis is false and the Argument
against Occasion-sensitivity is unsound.
However, the Evans method can be deployed only if the PN hypothesis is true and the PN
hypothesis is true only if the context of use of an expression is dense. Whether this is true
can change with the context in question. For the Evans method to be a viable method of
communication,  it's  going  to  need  to  be  the  case  that  contexts  of  use  are  dense  in  the
circumstances wherein linguistic communication can be successful—as I will put it, contexts
need  to  be  typically dense.  I  will  spend  the  remainder  of  this  section  discussing  the
assumption that contexts of use are typically dense. 
To find out whether contexts of use are typically dense requires an empirical investigation.
We  would  need  to  investigate  the  ends  pursued  by  speakers  when  they  speak  and  the
circumstances in which they do so. The aim of such an investigation would be to discover
whether the ends pursued by means of speaking, and the circumstances in which speakers do
so, provide sufficient rational constraints on the contents of linguistic expressions in context
for linguistic communication to be successful even if meanings aren't characters. That sort of
investigation would look a lot like the investigation carried out by (Austin 1962). One looks
for “the gap between cup and lip”—one looks for what participants count as successes and
failures at doing what they were aiming to do by speaking. There are sociologists who study
this with something like Austin's method.13 They claim that rich norms govern particular
locales for talk which greatly constrain what the rational agent would even attempt in such
circumstances.14 If that's right then plausibly typical circumstances of speech are dense. But
again  I  emphasize  that  this  is  a  question  to  be  answered  by  an  investigation  into  the
normative  structures  of  particular  social  environments—it  is  not  a  question  that  can  be
answered by those who have never looked.15
13 See (Goffman 1956:265), (Garfinkel 1963:187) and (Schegloff 2007:20) for statements of the “cup-
and-lip” method.
14 See Goffman's (1963:58) discussion of “the rule against “having no purpose” or being disengaged.”
Since Goffman, two fields within sociology have grown around the study of the actions and norms
of  small  social  contexts:  conversation  analysis  and  ethnomethodology.  For  an  introduction  to
conversation analysis see  (Schegloff 2007). For a recent taster of work in ethnomethodology see
the papers collected in (Linstead 2006).
15 In their discussion of metalinguistic disagreements—disagreements about with what content an
expression ought to be used in context—Plunkett and Sundell  (2013) propose that such disputes
are not settled by appeals to linguistic convention. In many cases, they are settled by non-linguistic
factors. They call the study of the factors that fix with what content an expression ought to be used
in context “conceptual ethics.” Insofar as it is empirically grounded, the burgeoning literature on
conceptual ethics (cf. (Burgess and Plunkett 2013)) could form part of the investigation needed to
ascertain whether contexts of talk are typically dense.
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Nonetheless, here's one reason why one might think that the assumption that contexts of use
are typically dense is a non-starter. Informal conversation—one might think—just is to chat
without any real further purpose. Surely, one might propose, those contexts are not dense
with requirements that would motivate a rational agent to use her words with only certain
contents and not others (cf.  (Lewis 1969:180)). However, though I cannot argue the point
(for reasons given in the previous paragraph), I suggest that this impression is born of a bad
memory. In informal contexts (e.g. a friend's party), there are things that one is aiming to do
by speaking: joke, flirt, suss-out someone's character, entertain, debate politics, be polite,
ridicule,  show concern,  and so on.  That one is  under a pressure to do these things with
reasonable competence is strongly suggested by the fact that sometimes one just isn't up to
it. Sometimes one knows that one wouldn't know what to (intend or try to) say in the context
of the party (or other informal environment). It's not that one would have nothing to say in
the sense that one wouldn't be able to find some proposition or other to try to express in that
context. One could easily do that. The problem is rather that one wouldn't know which ways
of speaking would be a way to do what one feels under pressure to do in that context. So even
if we might call a context “informal,” that doesn't mean that in that context there aren't ends
one ought to be pursuing by speaking therein—ends for which it can be a challenge to find
the means.
7 – Why is Kaplan's thesis endorsed?
To  the  extent  that  contexts  are  dense,  Kaplan's  thesis  is  false.  But  suppose  that  when
assessing whether Kaplan's thesis is true, one attended only to contexts which are not dense.
If one did that then the Evans method would never occur to one as a serious possible way of
communicating linguistically because in the restricted range of contexts one is considering, it
wouldn't be one.
It so happens that adherents of Kaplan's thesis pretty much always focus upon a context
which is not dense. Adherents of the thesis focus on contexts in which a speaker has the sole
end of getting a hearer to grasp the proposition she intends to express. Of course, this doesn't
mean that, if asked, adherents of Kaplan's thesis wouldn't allow that other ends are perhaps
invariantly being pursued by speaking. But I'm interested in their focus when, as seems to be
standard, they are not asked.
Stenius  (1967) describes a  “report-game”  in  which  the sole  aim of  one  participant  is  to
express one of a range of propositions to another participant. He (ibid, p.264) proposes that
it “is obvious that by means of the report-game A and B have created a small language for
communication” and he (ibid, p.265) proposes that we can generalize from this case—as if
this were an exemplar of ordinary linguistic communication. Lewis (1969) proposes that we
can understand linguistic communication as a coordination problem. But in order to do this,
he requires us to suppose that a would-be communicator has a preference for using given
linguistic expressions with given contents which is affected by nothing other than how her
fellow would-be communicator prefers to use such expressions (this is his assumption that
we  can  understand  linguistic  communication  by  focusing  on  situations  in  which  “a
coincidence of interest predominates” (ibid, p.14)). If so, then whoever speaks is aiming to do
no more than get her would-be recipient to grasp a given proposition by the sentence she
utters—again, as if this were the situation we should use as our way in to understanding
ordinary  linguistic  communication.  In  response  to  Davidson,  Dummett,  Hornsby  and
Reimer do likewise. Dummett (1986:471) claims that “in the normal case” given that a hearer
knows a language shared with a speaker, “there is nothing that his understanding the words
consists  in  save  his  hearing  them”—as  if,  in  typical  contexts  in  which  it  is  attempted,
successful linguistic communication consists of the production of sentences and their being
heard  and  nothing  more.  When  discussing  the  possibility  of  communication  given
Davidson's proposal, Hornsby (2009:110) focuses entirely on a case in which the only end of
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the speaker is to “be taken to mean what one wants to be taken to mean.” Reimer (2004:323)
works with a situation in which a speaker intends to communicate that p, ignoring whatever
other  pressures  might  impinge  upon  the  speaker  in  speaking—as  though  these  were
irrelevant.  Finally,  in  response  to  (amongst  others)  Travis,  Stanley  (2007:12),  when
discussing  the  possibility  of  linguistic  communication,  operates  with  a  conception  of
conversation  which  can  be  analysed  as  “acquiring  and  conveying  information  about  the
world,”  leaving  any  other  further  end  optional  for  the  purposes  of  successful  linguistic
communication.16 It is as though the adherents of Kaplan's thesis have supposed that because
alighting  upon  the  same  proposition  for  the  same  sentence  is  required  for  successful
linguistic  communication,  this  much  must  be  achieved  before  anything  can  be  done  by
means of communicating and hence that it can be done in principle without doing anything
by means of communicating.
In the context focused upon by the adherents of Kaplan's thesis, the exchange of propositions
is all that anyone is interested in achieving. The interlocutors will be successful in this aim,
no matter the other features of the context,  provided that  the speaker associates a given
content with a given (meaningful) expression if and only if the hearer does likewise. There
are many ways that this aim could be met because for any one meaningful expression, there
are many contents it could have and any assignment of contents to expressions will be a way
of fulfilling the aim. So, no matter the further features of the context, having this aim alone
leaves open the means for achieving it—there are many. But then such a context isn't dense.
Hence,  in  such  a  context,  the  PN  hypothesis  isn't  true.  But  then  the  Evans  method  of
communication cannot be executed in such a context.
However,  this fact should be of concern to an adherent of the Evans method only if  the
contexts upon which the adherents of Kaplan's thesis focus are typical. Although whether
typical contexts of talk are dense is a question that requires investigation, it is unlikely that
typical  contexts  of  talk  will  fail  to  be  dense  on  account  of  speakers'  having  ends  as
pathologically limited as they are in the context upon which the adherents' focus. To clean a
context of further ends you have to go to quite some lengths. Suppose you utter a sentence to
someone. Suppose you use “harimatu” in your sentence and both you and your interlocutor
speak Estonian and so know that “harimatu” means illiterate or uneducated. However, there
are  many  ways  that  someone  can  be  illiterate.  With  different  such  ways,  are  different
contents for “harimatu.” Suppose that you intend to use “harimatu” in a sentence to express
the proposition that David Cameron is illiterate in one of these ways and that your sole aim is
to express this proposition. Your act of speech is not anchored in anything in the vicinity or
in any other ends you might have. You have no reason to use “harimatu” with the content
you intend as opposed to any other. You don't even have any reason to speak to the person
you're speaking to, as opposed to any other, and certainly no reason to get them in particular
to entertain the proposition that you intend by your sentence—or any other proposition for
that matter. If we take this description of your action seriously, we can see that your act of
speech is  similar  to the acts  of  someone who “weeps or is  acutely apprehensive without
apparent cause, or who burns his personal belongings, or who tears up his postal-savings
certificates, or who dips the Bible in a bowl of water...”  (Goffman 1963:76). Your action is
eerily annexed from its surroundings.
16 With some irrelevant complications (i.e.  second order intentions),  the communicative situation
upon which Grice (1957) chooses to focus is also of this kind. This is consequential. It is not usual
for  those  who  abandon  the  idea  that  linguistic  communication  is  enabled  by  regularities  in
conventional properties to opt (in its stead) for the view that the content of an expression in a
context is what the speaker intends it to be, where this intention bears the features sketched by
Grice. For example, Davidson (1986) does this and as a result, for the reason put forward in this
section, he makes something of a mystery out of how linguistic communication is supposed to
proceed.
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However, we are not normally met with such annexed behaviour. We do not, as a matter of
habit, without either our circumstances or our observable actions betraying some purpose in
speaking (be it ours or not), utter a sentence to a random individual. Exchanges generally
require (possibly non-verbal) introductions. They take place in places which already begin to
hint at why we might want to talk to the person we approach. Many take place as part of
social events which facilitate certain actions and not others.  To find a situation which is
abstracted away from all this would require finding an exchange between voices that don't
exist in a context that would furnish rational, social creatures like ourselves, with reasons to
do certain things and not others. This suggests that the context upon which the adherents of
Kaplan's thesis focus cannot be taken as typical of those in which linguistic communication is
successful.  Of course, it  may still  be true that contexts of talk aren't  typically dense. The
current  point  is  only  that  this  can't  be  because  we  typically  have  the  blinkered  focus
(implicitly) presumed by the adherents of Kaplan's thesis. But then the fact that the Evans
method fails  in such a context cannot be used to discredit  that  method's  status as ours.
Nonetheless, and this is why I have discussed the context, the fact that the Evans method
doesn't work in such a context explains what might attract the adherents of Kaplan's thesis to
Kaplan's thesis. For if they focus on such contexts, supposing (as they do) that such contexts
are representative of contexts in which linguistic communication is successful, then it would
seem to them that the Evans method couldn't be the actual method by means of which we
communicate with language.
8 – Sociology
Let's summarise. To communicate a content by uttering a sentence requires making plain to
others  what  content  one  intends  to  express  with  the  sentence.  According  to  the  Evans
method, one cannot do this “directly”: one can as little make plain a given content to others
by uttering a sentence and fiercely intending to get others to recognize this as one can make
plain that one is waiting for an acquaintance while one loiters in the street by standing there
and fiercely intending that others so take one. To make a content that one intends to express
with a sentence recognizable to others, one has to visibly integrate one's utterance of the
sentence into a wider activity, just as one has to visibly integrate one's loitering into a wider
activity. One openly behaves as one who has one's wider aims would have reason to behave.
...when one person comes upon another who is waiting at an entrance for a third, the 
waiting person may glance at his watch and look up and down the street to give a  
visible familiar shape to his intention...(Goffman 1963:78–79)
Once your act can be recognized as the part of a larger whole that it is, others will be in a
position to know what you should be doing, including, what you should be doing with your
words. In a slogan, you can communicate linguistically by recognizably doing something else
for the sake of which you speak. The possibility of communicating in this way undermines
Kaplan's thesis because insofar as your wider actions and circumstances place constraints on
what ways of, for instance, being black would make one's speaking a way of pursuing those
wider actions, it doesn't require that the meanings of linguistic expressions be characters.
One will have sufficient reason to use “black” in a given context with one content over others
even if the conventional meaning of “black” in English doesn't supply one with such a reason
(given that one is aiming to speak English). This isn't to say that there are never contexts in
which, linguistic communication isn't possible by means of the Evans method. If one just
isn't using one's words as part of any such activity then the intentions one has for them will
be  obscure  to  others.  An  exclusive  focus  on  such  contexts  will  lead  one  to  find  certain
accounts  of  communication  more  plausible  than  others.  But  whether  what  one  finds
plausible corresponds to what is likely, depends on the representativeness of the contexts
that are one's focus—an issue that can be settled only by approaching contexts of talk as
objects of study and not merely as values of a variable. This doesn't mean that philosophy
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should “give way” to sociology (pace (Goffman 1983:32)), but, because the plausibility of a
philosophical view can (and in this case does) depend on empirical facts documented in parts
of that other field, it might be worth getting more acquainted with that field.17
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